Medieval philosophers clearly recognized that emotions are not simply "raw feelings" but complex mental states that include cognitive components. They analyzed these components both on the sensory and on the intellectual level, paying particular attention to the different types of cognition that are involved. This paper focuses on William Ockham and Adam Wodeham, two fourteenth-centuries authors who presented a detailed account of "sensory passions" and "volitional passions". It intends to show that these two philosophers provided both a structural and a functional analysis of emotions, i.e., they explained the various elements constituting emotions and delineated the causal relations between these elements. Ockham as well as Wodeham emphasized that "sensory passions" are not only based upon cognitions but include a cognitive component and are therefore intentional. In addition, they pointed out that "volitional passions" are based upon a conceptualization and an evaluation of given objects.
of the intellectual soul, which they also divided into a "cognitive" and an "appetitive" part, asking again what kind of passions are to be found there and how they differ from sensory passions. In their view, we are utterly unable to understand passions unless we analyze the relationship between cognitive and appetitive parts on each level as well as the interaction between the two levels. Only then do we get a clear picture of all the structural elements, and only then can we explain the causal role of all the relevant elements.
In light of this architecture of the soul, I intend to examine how two prominent fourteenth-century philosophers, William Ockham and his pupil Adam Wodeham, analyzed passions on both levels. It goes without saying that I will not be able to take into account all the dimensions of their complex explanatory model. I will discuss neither moral aspects (e.g., the importance attached to higher-level passions for the development of virtues) nor theological ones (e.g., the role passions play in the theory of beatific vision). 3 Since I am primarily interested in structural and causal aspects, especially in the way later medieval philosophers related elements in the cognitive part of the soul to those in the appetitive part, I will focus on the interplay between these parts and on the impact it has for an explanation of human actions.
To avoid misunderstandings, I should point out that speaking about parts of the soul does not amount to introducing various homunculi or separate faculties. Ockham emphasizes that intellect and will are not different entities within the human soul. Ontologically speaking, they are one and the same substance that is capable of bringing about different states or acts.
Thus, the intellect is nothing but the intellectual soul insofar as it produces cognitive acts, and the will is the very same soul insofar as it produces volitional acts. 4 There is only a real distinction between intellectual and sensory soul, not between intellect and will. In giving such an ontologically parsimonious explanation, Ockham clearly uses his "cleaver" to cut away a multiplicity of entities and really distinct parts. It is therefore hardly adequate to investigate the relationship between various parts understood as special entities, even if ones uses the expressions "intellect" and "will", as Ockham (and following him Wodeham) himself does. The basic questions should rather be how intellectual and volitional acts are interrelated and how they are based upon acts brought about by the sensory soul.
II
If we want to understand the activities of the sensory soul, we need to look at the way Ockham explains sensory cognition (notitia sensitiva). In his view, this type of cognition provides information about particular, material things and can be either intuitive or abstractive, depending on the senses that are involved. 6 If the external senses are activated, and if they grasp something present to them as present and existent, an intuitive cognition occurs. If, however, only the imagination as an internal sense is active and apprehends a thing without taking notice of its existence, there is mere abstractive cognition. This distinction can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose there is an apple in front of you and you see it as an existent apple. In that case, you have a sensory intuitive cognition. If there is no apple physically present to you, but you are terribly hungry and visualize an apple in your imagination, then you have nothing more than a sensory abstractive cognition. Normally, such an abstractive cognition presupposes an earlier intuitive one, for you cannot visualize an apple if you have not already seen one.
So far, the intellect has not been involved in the cognitive process. There is intellectual cognition (notitia intellectiva) only when the intellect starts forming mental terms, i.e., concepts, and when it apprehends the object by means of these terms. 7 Here, Ockham again distinguishes between intuitive and abstractive cognition. 8 Intuitive cognition occurs when the intellect apprehends a present and existent thing as an existent thing. More precisely, Ockham claims that by means of this cognition "one can know whether or not there is a thing such that, if there is a thing, the intellect immediately judges that it is and knows with evidence that 6 See Reportatio II, q. 12-13 (OTh V, 256-261); Reportatio III, q. 3 (OTh VI, 114-125). The thesis that sensory intuitive cognition provides the basis for further cognition is already stated in Ordinatio I, prologus (OTh I, 25).
7 On Ockham's identification of concepts with mental terms, thoroughly discussed by recent commentators, see C. Panaccio, Les mots, les concepts et les choses. La claim can easily be illustrated. Suppose that I decide to go to a flower shop where I will be exposed to exquisite scents and colors. In that case, my decision (an act of the will) is a mediate cause of pleasure, because it makes me go to a place where I will acquire a certain sensory cognition. This cognition will then cause pleasure. But the act of the will can by no means function as the immediate cause of pleasure. Were I exposed to rotten flowers, I could not command myself: feel pleasure! No matter how much I want a sensory passion, I cannot have it unless I have previously had the necessary sensory cognition.
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The fact that acts of the will can be an indirect cause shows that there is an important difference between human beings and brute animals. When a sheep sees a wolf, it cannot want to avoid the passion of fear, simply because it lacks volitional acts. It cannot even want to be in a situation where it would not be scared. We human beings, on the other hand, can want to expose ourselves to situations where we have different sensory cognitions and, consequently, different passions. In addition, we can use our intellect in order to conceive of one and the same situation in different ways. Suppose you suffer from wolf-phobia just like a sheep, but you learn that there are nice, tame wolves in the circus. Then, you can want to go to the circus so that you will have a sensory cognition of a wolf that will be shaped by what you have learned. That is, you will no longer see the wolf as a mere bundle of sensible qualities that scares you. You will see it as a tamed animal. This may make you overcome your wolf-phobia. So, unlike the unfortunate sheep, you can do something to change your passions. This is an important point in Ockham's theory. While not being under the immediate control of acts of the will, passions are not out of control either.
We can force ourselves to an éducation sentimentale (a) by exposing ourselves to situations in which we acquire certain sensory cognitions and (b) by conceptualizing these basic cognitions.
At this point someone might voice a fundamental objection against Ockham's claim that sensory cognitions cause passions. Why does he not admit that objects in the world play this causal role? Could he not appeal to his famous ontological razor or "cleaver" and claim that the wolf immediately causes fear when it is present to a person or to a sheep? No doubt,
Ockham would reject this suggestion because it misses the crucial point that an object in itself simply triggers our senses -nothing more. In some passages, he presents an explicit argument endorsing the thesis that it is the sensory cognition, not the external object, that plays the causal role. 21 If the object caused a passion, he says, the passion would disappear as soon as the object would be removed or destroyed. However, it is possible for a passion to persist af- therefore, the external object cannot be the immediate cause of a passion. This is an important thesis that should not be neglected. In Ockham's view, passions should not be explained in a crude behaviorist way, because it is not simply the stimulus stemming from an external object that causes a passion as a reaction. Rather, our sensory cognition plays the decisive causal role. To put it in a nutshell, we may say that it is not the world itself, but our sensory cognitive attitude toward the world that causes passions. This is why passions are "cognitively pe- of these passions can be found in a context that may look strange to modern readers, but was of great importance in the later Middle Ages, namely the debate about enjoyment (fruitio).
According to traditional Christian doctrine, God is the highest and final object -the only object human beings enjoy for its own sake, not with regard to something else. 30 The most perfect enjoyment will be reached in the beatific vision, when human beings contemplate God in, and for, himself. This theological thesis immediately raises the philosophical question of what kind of emotional state enjoyment is. Given that the human soul, separated from the body, can have it, it is certainly not a sensory passion. And given that it is not implemented in the body, it does not bring about bodily actions. So, what is it, and how is it caused? These questions sparked a general discussion about the structure and the causes of non-sensory passions.
All philosophers and theologians involved in this debate agreed that enjoyment, unlike sensory pleasure, is a conceptualized form of passion. If someone enjoys God's presence, one loves him as God, categorizing him as the highest and most desirable being. Given this obvious fact, one may be tempted to say that enjoyment and other forms of higher-level passions are an intellectual affair. That is, the intellectual soul, by grasping an object and conceptualizing it, brings about all these passions in its cognitive activities. Ockham firmly opposes such an intellectualist approach, holding instead that "enjoying is an act of the will alone."
31 He acknowledges that conceptualization plays a decisive role. But in his view, this does not amount to claiming that enjoyment is nothing but a special form of intellectual activity. Rather, it is the will that brings about an act of enjoyment when the intellect presents a certain object. Thus, when a person thinks about God, he or she performs an act of enjoyment that is a distinct volitional act. This separation of two acts seems to hint at a perfect analogy between "lower" and "higher" passions. As we have seen, on the sensory level, there needs to be a sensory cognition, which, however, is not in itself a passion.
Rather, a sensory cognition causes a sensory passion. Similarly, one may say that on the higher level, there needs to be a conceptual cognition, which, taken in itself, is not yet a passion.
Rather, a conceptual cognition causes a passion, i.e., a volitional act such as enjoyment.
Although it is tempting to construct such an analogy, it would not express Ockham's opinion. He explicitly rejects the claim that the intellect causes passions of the will, claiming instead: "... when the intellect presents an enjoyable object to the intellect -in a clear or in an obscure way, in particular or in general -, the will can actively produce an act of enjoyment with respect to that object, and this happens on natural grounds." 32 Quite obviously, Ockham emphasizes that there is no simple causal mechanism that makes the will come up with a certain passion whenever the intellect delivers a particular cognition. 33 The will can produce an act of enjoyment, but it need not.
Lurking in the background of this thesis is Ockham's famous doctrine of the liberty of the will: the will can act in conformity with objects and judgments presented by the intellect, but it does not have to. 34 Even if the intellect conceives of an object as something good and desirable, the will is free not to accept it and, consequently, not to enjoy it. In fact, the will has three options: it can accept it, not accept it, or take a neutral stance. by an intellectual apprehension. When such a passion arises, it requires its own cause: the will. 35 Now one might wonder how the structure of a volitional act of enjoyment is to be understood. Since Ockham often emphasizes that this act is distinct from an intellectual activity, it can hardly display the very same structure. Is it an act that has a mere phenomenal quality, comparable to a good feeling? Or is it an act that also comprises a cognitive component, even though it differs from an intellectual act? To answer these questions, we need to look at how Ockham explains the relationship between an act of enjoyment or a more mundane act of love (dilectio) and an act of pleasure (delectatio). Criticizing some of his contemporaries, among them Peter Auriol, he points out that there is a real distinction between these two acts. That is, a loving person who feels pleasure has two acts: (i) an intentional act of loving directed toward a certain person or state of affairs, and (ii) a non-intentional act of experiencing pleasure. The reason for this distinction is quite simple: there can be an act of love without there being an act of pleasure. 36 Ockham adduces a colorful example to illustrate this thesis. A devil can love to seduce a human being and make him sin, but he does not experience any pleasure in this despicable deed. He has, as it were, a cool-hearted love. 37 This example shows that an act of love is neither identical to, nor necessarily accompanied by, an act that has a certain phenomenal quality. It is not simply an act of "feeling good". Rather, an act of love (or in the case of love of God: an act of enjoyment) is an act that is about something and can be identified through its content. This content may be characterized in various ways, both as being propositional and non-propositional. Thus, the devil's act of love has the content that the human being should sin, whereas a human being's act of enjoyment simply has the content God. No matter how the content is structured (in a "complex" or a "simple" way, as Ockham would say), an act of love always has a content, and is therefore to be understood as a cognitive act. An act of pleasure, on the other hand, is a mere feeling that may or may not go along with the cognitive act. 35 It should be noted that this appeal to a distinct cause does not involve an ontological commitment to a spooky entity called "the will". As pointed out above (see n. 5), Ockham does not introduce the will as an entity or faculty that would be really distinct from the intellect. The expression "the will" is always to be understood as "the intellectual soul insofar as it produces volitional acts". There is only an ontological commitment to various acts, not to various parts, of the soul. 36 See Ordinatio I, dist. 1, q. 3 (OTh I, 407). 37 See Ordinatio I, dist. 1, q. 3 (OTh I, 408). If we understand Wodeham's claim that every passion "is some cognition and some apprehension" in this way, it comes close to what is nowadays known as the cognitivist theory of emotions. But how then is the special way of cognizing to be understood? In the current debate, cognitivists give a clear answer to this question. M. Nussbaum, for instance, claims that emotions are "judgments of value," i.e., ways of evaluating things and states of affairs. 43 Following this line, one might interpret Wodeham as claiming that passions of the will are a special kind of judgment -a judgment by which we evaluate things as good or bad for us.
IV
Although Wodeham clearly defends a cognitivist position, we should be careful when appealing to judgments in a modern explanation of his view. If one takes a judgment to be something composed of the propositional attitude of affirming or denying and a propositional content ("I affirm/deny that p"), then Wodeham clearly denies that passions of the will are always judgments. In his third thesis, he unequivocally says that "a volition one has formed is an apprehending cognition, not an assenting one" 44 and argues for this claim as follows: "...
something pleasurable can be loved if it is apprehended exclusively by a simple, non-complex cognition. And something can be loved when it is apprehended in a complex way, without there being any assent or dissent. Therefore, a volitional act is only an apprehension." 45 This sounds like puzzling scholastic jargon, but it makes perfect sense when we illustrate it with the example I just mentioned. When you meet an old friend, you can apprehend her as a friend or as a good person. This simple apprehension, which does not involve the objective judgment that she really is a good person (she might appear to be good just to you or just in a specific situation), suffices for a cognitive passion. You then love her as the person you apprehend under a certain aspect. And even if you apprehend your friend "in a complex way", i.e., by grasping a propositional content, all you need to apprehend is that she is a good person. In Wodeham's terminology, this propositional content is a "complexe significabile" that cannot be reduced to something non-complex. 46 The important point is that you do not have to come up with the full-fledged judgment "I affirm that she is a good person" -grasping the propositional content suffices. For it is one thing to grasp such a content, quite another to give an assent or dissent to that content. 47 Wodeham concedes that there may be judgments in some cases, and provides an illustrating example. 48 If someone is happy about the death of his enemy, he does form a judgment in the very act of happiness, namely "The enemy is dead", which includes an assent to the fact that a certain person, apprehended as an enemy, is dead. It may be spelled out as follows: "I affirm that the person apprehended as an enemy is dead and I am happy about this fact." But the important point is that there does not need to be a judgment in every case of a cognitive passion. That is why Wodeham suggests that we should carefully distinguish between (a) cognitive passions that are mere apprehensions and (b) cognitive passions that involve judgments. This distinction has an important consequence for the problem of truth-values of passions, as Wodeham is quick to point out. 49 If one has a passion of type (a), the content of the passion clearly does not have a truth-value. Thus, if you simply love your friend as a good person, the content as a good person is neither true nor false. If, however, someone judges that the enemy is dead and is happy about this fact, the content that the enemy is dead is true or false. It is precisely its truth-value that distinguishes such a propositional content from a non-propositional one.
The crucial point is that in every passion, whether it involves a judgment or not, an object or a state of affairs is apprehended in a certain way. This apprehension is not descriptive but evaluative, as Wodeham's own example of love makes clear. For even if the loving person does not form the judgment "x is a pleasurable thing", she apprehends x under a certain aspect, namely as something pleasurable (delectabile). In doing so, she clearly evaluates x as having a positive quality. This differs from a mere descriptive apprehension, an apprehension of x as being tall or dark, for instance. This example shows that a cognitive passion, though not being an evaluative judgment in the strict sense, includes an evaluative element that distinguishes it from basic cognitions. This is one of the main reasons why a cognitive passion is a higher-level cognition. In having such a passion, one does not simply describe perceptible features of an object. One also evaluates the object as good or bad, agreeable or disagreeable.
In light of this distinction, we can draw a picture with the following hierarchy of cog- This picture simply presents the hierarchical structure without taking into account all the possible interrelations between the various levels. Since human beings make simultaneous use of their sensory and intellectual capacities, activities on a higher level may very well shape those on a lower level. For instance, the way we conceive of and categorize objects has an impact on the way we see and imagine them. For that reason, there are not only preconceptual acts of seeing and imagining on the first level (as in the case of brute animals), but also conceptualized ones. Following Aristotle (see An. Post. II, 19; 100b1), all medieval authors conceded that we do not simply see or apprehend individual items, but also universals (e.g., we see Callias as a man). This clearly presupposes the use of concepts in the very act of seeing. of passions, nor their internal structure, can be explained without an appeal to cognitive activities. This has an immediate consequence for an understanding of the relationship between the so-called "cognitive" and the "appetitive" part of the soul. When Ockham and Wodeham referred to these parts, they did not intend to divide the soul into two neatly separated sections. Nor did they want to introduce various homunculi that would somehow be hidden but nevertheless active in a human being. Rather, their intention was to refer to mental activities that a person performs when he or she copes with complex situations. It is in fact the coordination of various mental activities that distinguishes a person from a brute animal, on the one hand, and from an angel, on the other. For an animal, endowed with a sensory soul, is capable of having mere sensory passions that enable it to behave in an appropriate way. But it is utterly unable to conceptualize the situation with which it is confronted. Consequently, it cannot have higher-level passions by which it would evaluate or assess a given situation. Nor can it try to conceptualize the situation in various ways, so that it would come up with different passions. It is a helpless victim of its naturally caused passions. Angels, on the other hand, endowed with an intellectual soul, are clearly capable of forming intellectual and volitional acts, and are therefore able to develop a conceptualized passionate attitude towards things with which they are confronted. 55 Yet angels lack sensory cognition and therefore cannot have bodily passions that would make them cry or laugh. As fleshless beings, they are condemned to have fleshless passions. Occupying a middle position between animals and angels, human beings have both a sensory and an intellectual soul. This allows them to bring about lowerand higher-level passions, i.e., embodied and conceptualized emotions. In fact, it was this middle position on which Ockham, Wodeham, and many other medieval philosophers were focusing when they tried to explain human passions. This enabled them to avoid reducing a 55 Ockham discusses angelic passions (his main example is love) in Quaestiones variae, q. 6, art. 9 (OTh VIII, 257-258 and 269-270). In response to this objection, one could point out that Ockham and Wodeham, like the majority of later medieval thinkers, certainly did not locate all mental activities in the body.
Since they took the intellectual soul to be an entity that is not subject to material conditions, they would have denied that there could be a neurobiological explanation (or in medieval terms: an explanation within the framework of the physica) of all the passions. They were quite obviously only "semi-materialists" in their metaphysics of the soul. It was this possibility of conflict that late medieval philosophers wanted to point out in their functional explanation: different cognitions play different causal roles in the mechanism of the mind, and consequently, they give rise to different passions. Their intention was not simply to dissolve emotional conflict by claiming that, say, the will as a higher faculty perfectly controls all the passions and unifies them. They admitted, of course, that the will has a certain ruling power, and in their theories of virtues, they assigned to it the task of bringing about the best possible higher-level passions, which would become some kind of second nature and influence the genesis of our sensory passions. Yet they insisted on the fact that the so-called lower-level passions should not be neglected. The will is not a magic power that could, or should, make the sensory passions disappear. Nor can it arrange all the higher-level passions in a harmonious way. It is just one capacity of the soul that cooperates with other capacities to bring about a multitude of passions -passions that may be in conflict with each other. One can do justice to the 
Humboldt-Universität
57 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Université de Montréal, Saint Louis University, and Washington University. I am grateful to the audience in all three places for stimulating questions and critical remarks.
